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TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION OF KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS: EXPECTATIONS AND CONSTRAINED
EQUILIBRIA*
J. PETER NEARY AND JOSEPH E . STIGLITZ
A two-period model of temporary equilibrium with rationing is presented, paying
particular attention to agents' expectations of future constraints. It is shown that with
arbitrary constraint expectations many different types of current equilibrium may
be consistent with the same set of (current and expected future) wanes and prices, and
that constraint expectations exhibit "bootstraps" properties (e.g., a higher expectation
of Keynesian unemployment tomorrow increases the probability that it will prevail
today). In addition, the concept of rational constraint expectations (i.e., perfect
foresight of future constraints) is introduced and shown t« enhance rather than reduce
the effectiveness of government policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an old answer to an old question: how can
we explain unemployment equilihria? The answer, provided both by
Keynes and by more recent equilibrium analysts, is that there is some
rigidity in prices (of factors or commodities) in the economy. It is
well-known that, if all prices are flexible, all factors (which are not in
absolute surplus) will be fully employed in equilibrium. Although the
precise articulation of the nature of equilibrium when prices are not
flexible, including the derivation of demand and supply curves when
participants are constrained in their purchases or sales of factors and
commodities, is of a more recent vintage,' the basic insight that when
there is a rigidity in some factor or commodity price, then equilibrium
must entail rationing in some markets, remains unaltered.^
* An earlier version of this paper, circulated as NBER Working Paper No. 376,
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However, most recent studies of fix-price macro models have
considered a single period only, focusing on the consequences of
current wage-price rigidity.'* This neglects the fact that, in the absence
of futures markets, individuals must base their decisions on expec-
tations, and, as Keynes emphasized, expectations of the future have
important effects on the nature of the current equilibrium."* The ob-
jective of this paper is to explore these effects in tbe context of a
two-period model of temporary equilibrium with rationing.
The first point we wish to stress is that, if future prices and wages
are not expected to be market-clearing, then individuals wiil expect
to face quantity constraints, and these expected future quantity
constraints critically affect current behavior. In particular, we show
that, if individuals expect there to be unemployment next period, it
is more likely (in a sense to be defined more precisely) that there will
be unemployment this period; whereas if individuals expect there to
be excess demand for goods next period, then it is more likely that
there will be excess demand for goods this period. As a result, for any
particular set of current wages and prices, there may exist multiple
expectational equilibria that exhibit "bootstraps" properties; e.g., if
bouseholds expect that they will be unable to sell all their labor both
this period and next, then it will turn out that they will be unable to
sell all their labor; but had they expected there to be inflationary
pressures this period and next, then that would have turned out to
be the case instead.
The second major issue that we consider is the effect of alterna-
tive assumptions about how expectations are formed. In recent years
it has become fashionable, at least on one side of the Atlantic, to focus
on a particular set of expectational assumptions—what bas come to
be called rational expectations (or, perhaps less emotively, perfect
stochastic foresight). Without taking sides on either the logical con-
sistency or the behavioral plausibility of this assumption, we inves-
tigate the nature of the equilibrium when all households and firms
have perfect foresight, not only about future wages and prices and
about whether or not they will be constrained in any particular mar-
ket, but also about the magnitudes of the constraints they will face.
We demonstrate that there may still exist equilibria in which there
is unemployment. The paper thus serves to clarify the distinctive roles
played by the assumptions of rational expectations and price flexi-
3. For a detailed examination of the causes and consequences of wage and price
rigidities, see Stiglitz [1978].
4. For example, as Grandmont [1982] has noted, if expectations are not sufficiently
flexible, a fuil-eniployment equilibriuna may not exist, even if current wages and prices
are perfectly flexible.
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bility in some recent models of macroeconomic equilibrium: rational
expectations are consistent both with full employment and unem-
ployment equilibria; it is perfect wage and price flexibility that is
necessary (but not sufficient) to ensure full employment, in gen-
eral.
The model we construct also has policy implications that differ
significantly from those of the recent rational-expectations literature.
The latter, for instance, has emphasized the inefficacy of fully an-
ticipated government policy; we show, on the contrary, that rational
expectations actually result, in certain situations, in the multipliers
associated with government policy being greater than they would be
with, say, static expectations: an increase in government expenditure
today has a spillover effect in raising national income at a future date;
if the equilibrium at that date is also a Keynesian (demand-con-
strained) equilibrium, then that increases the demand for lalx>r at that
date; the anticipation of this increased demand for labor reduces
savings currently, and hence current aggregate demand rises.
We believe that the model we have constructed, simple as it is,
captures much of what was contained in Keynes, but seems to be
missing in one-period macroeconomic models of temporary equilib-
rium with rationing, in which savings and investment, interest rates,
and expectation formation play no critical role. Thus, from a technical
viewpoint, the present paper may be thought of as an extension of the
earlier studies of Solow-Stiglitz, Barro-Grossman, and Malinvaud;
by formulating a two-period model that pays explicit attention to
households' and firms' expectations of future quantity constraints
and in which the real interest rate as well as the wage rate is sticky,
we believe we have come much closer to capturing the essence of
traditional views concerning the nature of unemployment equilibria.
As a side benefit, we believe that the investment and consumption
functions that we derive provide a better basis than the neoclassical
functions that have become fashionable in the last two decades for
future theoretical and empirical work in this area.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 11 we outline the
microeconomic foundations of the model, and in Section III we il-
lustrate the determination of notional equilibrium when all wages and
prices are flexible, and examine the various types of effective equi-
librium that can prevail when the current and expected future wage
rate and output price are sticky. In this section we assume that agents
have Walrasian expectations (by which we mean that they do not
expect to face any quantity constraints in the future), whereas in
Sections IV and V we investigate the consequences of arbitrary and
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rational constraint expectations, respectively. Sections VI and VII
consider the comparative statics properties of the model, paying
particular attention to the magnitude of the Keynesian multiplier
under different expectational assumptions. Finally, Section VIII
summarizes the paper's conclusions and notes some directions for
further research.
II. T H E MODEL: HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM BEHAVIOR^
In the model to be considered, private-sector agents form plans
for the remainder of their lifetimes at the beginning of the current
period on the basis of their subjectively certain point expectations
concerning future prices, wages, and constraint levels. Although the
model is thus implicitly a multiperiod one, only the first two periods,
labeled " 1" and "2," are treated explicitly, while agents' preferences
over all subsequent periods are summarized by including as an
argument in their objective function their holdings of assets at the
end of the second period.
To illustrate this procedure, consider first the household sector.
For simplicity, we abstract from distribution effects and so assume
that the sector's behavior can be characterized as if it were the out-
come of the maximization of a single aggregate utility function. We
also assume that total labor supply in each period is fixed.*' Hence,
the sector's utility function (written in additive form) depends on
consumption in each period, Ci and cz, and on the amount of real
money balances held at the end of the second period, m2/p2'-
(1) U = u(ci)
The function <{>{•) indirectly represents the utility derived from con-
sumption in all periods beyond the first two, and so depends on ex-
pectations of prices, incomes, and constraint levels in those periods.
In the present paper we assume that these expectations, denoted by
the vector S, are independent of all that happens in the first two pe-
riods, and so may be treated as exogenous.^
5. The present version of the model differs in a number of respects from what
appeared in NBER Working Paper No. 376. In particular, profits are now assumed
to be redistributed instantaneously to households, and end-of-period-2 asset holdings
are included as arguments in both agents' objective functions. These changes make
little substantive difference to the properties of the model, and they avoid some im-
plausible artifacts that had to be introduced in the earlier version to avoid a zero price
of money in period 2. At the same time, we have reservations about the inclusion of real
balances in the household's utility function, for reasons on which we hope to elabt)rate
in a subsequent paper.
6. The simplifying assumption of fixed labor supply precludes the possibility of
a Barro-Grossman "supply multiplier" in states of generalized excess demand.
7. This assumption is relaxed in a subsequent paper.
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In the absence of any quantity constraints, maximization of (1)
is carried out subject only to the budget constraint (2):
(2) piCi+p2C2 + m2< Y,
where p\ is the current output price and P2 is the price that is cur-
rently expected to prevail next period. Y is total income received in
the first two periods, consisting of households' initial endowment of
money balances mo, and of their current income in each period, which,
since households are the sole owners of firms, equals the total value
of output that households expect to be produced each period:
(3) y = mo + pij i +P2y2.
Note that (unlike Malinvaud) we assume that both wages and profits
are distributed instantaneously to households,** implying (since leisure
does not enter the utility function) that the marginal propensity to
consume out of each is the same.
Maximization of (1) subject to (2) leads to unconstrained or
notional demand functions for current and future consumption:
(4) ci(pi,p2,y) and
These functions are homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal vari-
ables, including the prices expected to prevail beyond period 2 that
form part of the vector 6. However, since these expectations are
treated as parameters, it is more convenient to suppress them and to
write the functions in extensive form as shown.
The signs of the partial derivatives of the functions in (4) are as
indicated. Naturally, we assume that consumption in each period is
a normal good and responds negatively to changes in the price pre-
vailing in that period. However, the effect on current consumption
of a change in the price of future output (i.e., the effect on savings of
a change in the interest rate) is indeterminate in general, since, as is
well-known, the income and substitution effects of such a change work
in opposite directions. In the diagrams below we assume for conve-
nience that the substitution effect dominates, so that dci/dp2 is al-
ways positive, but this assumption is not crucial.
Turning next to firms, we see that their behavior is modeled in
an analogous manner.^ We assume that it can be viewed as the out-
come of the actions of a representative firm that maximizes the dis-
8. Or that there is no "corporate veil," so that it is as if all wages and profits are
distributed.
9. The essential difference between households and firms is that the former are
assumed to be able to store money but not goods, and conversely for the latter.
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counted sum of current and future profits (the latter measured in
present value prices), with profits in all periods beyond the second
determined by the level of investment in period 2:
(5) n = TT] + 7r2 +
When the firm faces no quantity constraints, it chooses current and
future employment levels, ei and 62, as well as /i and I2, the quantities
of output in each period that it holds over as investment to augment
the productivity of labor in the future. Profits in periods 1 and 2 are
therefore given by the following:
(6) TTi
(7) 7r2 =
where Fie\) is current output and H(e2./i) is output next
We assume that production is subject to diminishing returns to each
factor in both periods: F^f.,H^,.,Hj! < 0; that labor and investment are
complementary in the production of future output: H^i > 0; and that
the production function for future output is strictly concave: H^^Hj/
— Hfi > 0 (i.e., that labor and investment are subject to diminishing
returns to scale). Under these assumptions, unconstrained profit
maximization leads, as shown in the Appendix, to notional employ-
ment and investment demand functions:
(8) ei(pi,K;i), /i(pi,p2,u)2), eHpi,p2,W2), and
These in turn imply notional output supply functions yi and net





10. If the state of technology is Riven, the current production function F{-) may
be viewed as identical to the future production function Hi-) with a predetermined
level of investment: F{e]) = HieiJu). We explicitly assume that H(-) is strictly concave
(thus rulint; out, for example, the form Hie-zJ]} = Fle-z) + /i I, since otherwise future-
period production levels would be indeterminate, unless firms expected to face a sales
or employment constraint next period.
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As in the case of households, equations (8) to (12) are homogeneous
of degree zero in all nominal variables, but it is more convenient to
write them in extensive form and to suppress the exogenous expec-
tations vector (I. We note that, when firms face no quantity con-
straints, current employment demand and output supply as given by
(9) depend only on the current price and wage rate: a change in ex-
pected future wages or prices changes the amount of current output
held over as investment and so changes current sales, but (provided
that notional output supply does not fall below desired investment)
it does not affect current employment and output decisions. Similarly
next period's employment and output decisions are independent of
the current wage rate.
The third and final agent in the economy is the government,
which can make direct transfer payments to households, increasing
their initial endowment mo, or can make direct purchases of goods
in both present and future periods, g i and g2- All of these actions are
financed by printing money, so there is no analogue in our model to
"pure" or bond-financed fiscal policy.
III. NOTIONAL AND EFFECTIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH
WALRASIAN EXPECTATIONS
Having made these assumptions about the individual agents in
the economy, we can now characterize a full Wairasian equilibrium
by a wage-price vector (pi,u'i,P'2.^2). which simultaneously satisfies
the notional current and future goods-market equilibrium loci
{GMED and the notional current and future labor-market equilib-
rium loci {LMEL):
(13) GMELi(W,W):
(14) GMEL2iW,W): C2(puP2,y) +
(15) - LMELiiW,W): L =
(16) ' LMEL2{W,Wy. L = e2(Pi,P2,"^2),
where L is the household's full-employment or notional labor supply
in both periods.'' (Here and throughout the paper every equilibrium
II. Equations (i;U and U4) may be manipulated, along with (2). CD. (9), and (iU).
to yield a fifth equation, the government budget constraint, which states that total
government spending in the two periods must equal the excess of private-sector
withdrawals (i.e.. net household savings) over injections (i.e., corporate investment):
PiA'i + P'2M2= im-z-mo) - (Pi/i + pa/y)- The latter equation must always hold as an
ex post accounting identity whether markets are cleared by quantity or price adjust-
ment.
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locus refers to a particular period, denoted by a subscript, and is
contingent on two regimes, indicated in parentheses: the first is the
regime that prevails in the current period, and the second what is
expected to prevail next period. W denotes Walrasian equilibrium.)
Equations (13) to (16) are completed by specifying that the income
which households expect to receive each period is that corresponding
to the full-employment level of output (denoted by an asterisk); i.e.,
(3) is replaced by
(17) Y = rfT + n v ' -1- n v*
While equations (13) to (16) determine the full Walrasian
wage-price vector, our concern in the remainder of this paper is with
the nature of the equilibria that obtain, under different assumptions
about constraint expectations, when some prices or wage rates differ
from their Walrasian levels. In order to study this, it is desirable to
reduce the dimensionality of the model, and we have chosen to confine
our attention to variations in Wi and P2, assuming that pi and W2 re-
main equal at all times to their full Walrasian equilibrium values, p\
and W2. (It may be checked that our qualitative conclusions continue
to bold if Pl and Wi are varied, holding pa and W2 fixed.) With varia-
tions in only two prices under consideration, we may also dispense
with two of the equilibrium loci, (13)-(16), and we have chosen to focus
on the two first-period equilibrium loci, (13) and (15). Figure I illus-
trates how these two equations determine the Walrasian market-
clearing values of OJi and P2. Given pj, the notional LMELx, equation
(15), uniquely defines w{, points above this locus representing excess
supply of, and points below representing excess demand for labor,
while the notional GMELi, equation (13), defines a downward-sloping
FIGURE I
Notional Equilibria with Walrasian Expectations
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locus, points above it corresponding to excess demand for goods and
points below to excess supply of goods. (The assumption that current
consumption responds positively to an expected rise in P2 is sufficient
but not necessary to ensure that the GMELi is downward-sloping.)
It may be noted that the equilibrium at A is globally stable if w i and
P2 change according to tatonnemerit processes. This may be seen
more easily by noting that the GMELx is a standard IS curve, with
points above it representing situations where investment demand
exceeds savings, requiring a rise in the "interest rate" implicit in the
model (i.e., a fall in p^) to restore equilibrium and conversely for points
below the locus.
When w\ and po are rigid, however, the division of the space into
disequilibrium regions cannot be the same as in Figure I, for the by
now well-known reason that a disequilibrium in one market affects
decisions in the other market, so affecting the location of the equi-
librium loci at all points other than the full Walrasian equilibrium
point A. In the remainder of this section we show how the regions are
affected when W\ and p2 are arbitrarily fixed and so disequilibrium
prevails, on the crucial assumption (to be relaxed in the next section)
that all agents expect a Walrasian equilibrium to prevail in the next
period. We also assume for simplicity that the same expectations of
future wage and price levels are held by all agents, and we continue
to assume that p i is fixed at p \ and that expectations of future wages
are completely inelastic at the Walrasian level w'l.
Consider first the goods-market equilibrium locus under con-
ditions of excess supply of labor (ESL): for all wage rates greater than
w\ in Figure I, some unemployment prevails, and so households'
current income is below the full-employment level pi>'I. Hence, the
effective GMELi is not (13),
(18) GMELi{ESL,W): ciip
(19) Y = mo
12. As in Neary [1980] we adopt the following notational convention throughout;
a bar over a variable (e.g., ej) indicates that, from the point of view of the agent under
consideration, its vedue is predetermined in the current period; a tilde (e.g-.^i) indicates
a function or parameter arising from behavior in the face ofa labor-marKet constraint;
a circumtlex (e.g.,,"?!) indicates behavior in the face ofa goods-market constraint; and
symbols are used to indicate behavior in the face of multiple constraints (e.g., .vi denotes
behavior in the face of a goods-market constraint in both periods).
13. In this case, unlike (17), there is some ambiguity as ti» what value should be
assigned toy}, the full-employment level of income that households expect to receive
next perifxl. Since investment depends on p-i, a chimge in this variable affects the capital
stock and so the level of full-employment output in period 2. However, it makes little
difference to the analysis whether or not households are assumed to take account of
this.




Effective Equilibria with Walrasian Expectations
Since constrained income Y is less than notional income Y whenever
Wl exceeds w\, it follows that households' effective consumption de-
mand is reduced as a result of the unemployment they face, and so
a point of notional goods-market equilibrium in {wuP2) space corre-
sponds to effective excess supply of current output. In passing from
notional to effective regions, therefore, the effective GMELi{ESL,W)
lies to the right of the notional GMEL i (VV, W), as shown in Figure II
(where each locus is labeled by the number of the equation that de-
fines it). Of course, the two loci differ only for values oiwi greater than
u'l, since it is only in this range that tbe employment constraint facing
households is binding (i.e., ei(p;,u)i) <L and soyi(pl,u;i) <y]).
A similar argument applies to the GMELi when the labor market
exhibits excess demand {EDL): households are now unconstrained,
whereas firms' current production is constrained by the labor they
can obtain:
(20)
-I- + - -
(20')
where e\ is simply L and is less than the notional demand for labor
ei(pi."Ji)- We may note tbat, under our assumptions, the excess de-
mand for labor does not affect firms' investment plans (assuming, of
course, that the constraint does not become so severe that their
maximum output level falls below their desired level of investment).
If we compare (20) with (13), it must follow, since the employment
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constraint bites, that effective supply is less than notional supply,
implying that the constrained GMELi lies to the left of the notional
locus when excess demand for labor prevails (i.e., when wi is less than
w\), as shown in Figure II.
The LMELi is affected in a similar manner when the goods
market is out of equilibrium. Thus, in a situation of excess supply of
goods, households are unconstrained, but firms are unable to make
their notional level of sales. This forces them to recalculate their
employment and investment decisions, with the result that the
LMELi becomes
(21) LMELiiESCW): L = ei\xi;wi,p2M]
+ - + -
(21') = F~^[xi + !i\xi;wi,p2,W2\],
+ -
where the current sales constraint facing firms is^ **
(22) xi =ci(pi,P2,V') +^1 <xiiplwi,p2,W2).
We may note that, by contrast with (8), current employment demand
now depends on much more than just the current real wage: the de-
mand for labor is determined both by what firms are able to sell and
by what they decide to store. The latter is itself in turn affected by
the sales constraint, by contrast with an employment constraint that,
as equation (200 shows, does not affect the relative profitability of
selling and investing. When we compare equations (15) and (21), since
constrained employment demand ei is less than notional employment
demand e i a point of notional labor-market equilibrium must corre-
spond to effective excess supply of labor when excess supply of goods
prevails; (21) therefore lies below (15) in Figure II. However, when
we compare (21') with (20'), since constrained investment demand
/i must be greater than notional investment demand /i, it follows that
these two loci do not coincide and that (21) lies to the left of (20). Al-
lowing investment to be carried out by firms therefore leads to a region
of effective excess supply of goods and excess demand for labor, or,
in the terminology of Mueilbauer and Portes 1.1978], a region of un-
derconsumption.
14, As with other models of temporary equilibrium with rationing, though unlike
the textbook Keynesian model, we assume that firms face a constraint on their sales
net of investment demand, rather than on their gross sales. Otherwise, with only one
representative firm using a single input to pri;)duce a homogeneous output, the corporate
sector could never face strictly binding rations in both labor and goods markets, and
so region U in Figure II would vanish.
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Finally, when excess demand for goods prevails and the labor
market is in equilibrium, firms are unconstrained, and, though
households are rationed in the goods market, the assumption that
labor is supplied inelastically ensures that this does not affect their
labor supply. The effective LMEL^ therefore coincides with the
notional locus (15): as shown in Figure II, the boundary between re-
gions C and R does not pivot around point A.
These shifts from notional to effective equilibrium loci are
summarized in Figure II (where the notional loci are shown as dashed
lines and the effective loci as solid lines). Following now-standard
usage, we may label the four regions K for Keynesian unemployment,
C for classical unemployment, R for repressed infiation, and (/ for
underconsumption. The nature of the disequilibrium in the two
markets that prevails in each region is the same as in the corre-
sponding notional regions in Figure L^ ^
IV. INTERTEMPORAL SPILLOVERS AND "BOOTSTRAPS"
EFFECTS
We now turn to the central focus of this paper: the effects of ex-
pectations by households or firms that they will face constraints in
the future. One of the central concerns of the recent literature on
fix-price models has been to show how a disequilibrium in one market
has effects that spill over into other markets. In the light of this, it is
not surprising that expectations of future constraints should have a
significant effect on the behavior of firms and households in current
markets. Our objective here, however, is more than simply to dem-
onstrate that such intertemporal spillovers occur. We wish to show
that they exhibit what we call a "bootstraps" property: households'
expectations of future constraints on the sale of labor make it more
likely that there will be a constraint on their ability to sell labor cur-
rently; while expectations by firms of constraints on their ability to
sell goods in the future make it more likely that they will face a sales
constraint in this period. It is this bootstraps property that leads to
the possibility of there being multiple equilibria consistent with the
same level of current wages and prices, and expected future wages and
prices.
In this section we consider the general class of exogenously given
15. Figures I and 11 are in fact identical to the corresponding diagrams illustrating
the regions of notional and effective equilibria in {wfp,m/p) space in the Barro-
Grossman-Malinvaud model, provided it is assumed that labor is supplied inelastically
and that investment may be carried out by firms.
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constraint expectations. In the following section, the techniques that
we have developed will be employed to investigate the special case
where expectations are rational.^^ Our strategy is to examine the ef-
fects of such expectations on the location of the various disequilibrium
regions in (w'bps) space. To illustrate the general points, we look in
detail at two particularly interesting effects: those of expected
Keynesian and classical unemployment on the location of the locus
separating regions K and C (i.e., the GMELi when current unem-
ployment prevails).
The first point to emphasize is that if agents expect to be con-
strained next period this may affect their current behavior even ifivi
and P2 are flexible; in otber words, it may shift the notional equilib-
rium loci in Figure I. Admittedly, this is not true of the LMEL],
equation (15), since labor supply is fixed and, when firms face no
constraints in the present period, their current employment decisions
are determined only by pi and u'l, irrespective of what constraints
they expect to face next period. However, the notional GMELi is af-
fected. Consider first the case where agents expect regime K (excess
supply of both labor and goods) to prevail next period. This displaces
the notional locus for two distinct reasons. First, since households
expect to be unemployed next period, their expected income is re-
duced, and so (13) must be replaced by
(23) GMELiiW,ESL): ci(plp2,Y') + 8i = xi{p
where
(24) Y' = mo + p\y\ + p-m^ y-> < y-i-
The lowering of the income that households expect to receive next
16. In the context of a nonstochastic fix-price model, the particular sense in which
the term rational expectations has come to be understood has extremely strong im-
plications: all individuals have perfect foresight not only concerning ihe level of wages
and prices that will prevail in the future and the constraints that will be binding, but
also ctmcerning the magnitude of those constraints. This degree of foresight seems
highly implausible. A more general model would take into account explicitly the fact
that individuals do not have point estimates of the constraints that they will face, but
rather a probability distribution, Since the idiosyncratic components determining the
precise distribution of the values of the constraints facinf^any one household or firm
may be relatively large, the individual may have little basis on which to learn when his
distribution differs from the "true" distribution. Moreover, since individuals are
risk-averse and are typically unable to fully insure against the risks associated with
facing particular constraints in the future, the certainty-equivalent value of the con-
straint may differ markedly from the mean value of tbe constraint. For these reasons,
we conjecture that the discussion of this section may be of greater relevance than the
more restricted assumption of rational expectations we employ in the next section.
However, not all readers have agreed with us, and. f(>r those readers, the present section
should be viewed as simply developing the analytical tools that will be employed in
the next.




























Notional Equilibria with Arbitrary Expectations of Classical or Keynesian
Unemployment
period to p25'2 reduces their current consumption, and so shifts the
notional locus to the right at all points, expanding the region of current
excess supply of goods, as shown in Figure III. (Compare the lines
labeled (13) and (23).)
The expectation by all agents that Keynesian unemployment will
prevail next period also displaces the notional locus for a second
reason, since firms now expect to face a sales constraint X2 next period.
However, such an exogenous expected constraint is not binding for
all wage-price combinations, but only for those that imply a level of
notional sales next period which violates the constraint; i.e., for
which
(25) X2<X2iplP2,w'2).
Given pf and W2, (25) written as an equality defines pf, the threshold
level of P2 at which the constraint is just binding on firms, as an in-
creasing function of the expected constraint x-z- (Clearly, pf must lie
below P2, since otherwise the corresponding expected constraint X2
would exceed the notional level of sales at the full Walrasian price
vector X2iPi,p'2,w'2).) For values of p^ belowp^', sales in period 2 are
relatively unprofitable, and so the expected constraint is not a binding
one, and the locus we are seeking coincides with (23). However, for
values of P2 abovepf, firms' notional sales next period exceed X2, and
so they must recalculate their plans for both periods, which leads to
(23) being replaced by (26):
(26) GMELi{W,K):
(26')
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The expected sales constraint reduces current investment and so
"spills over" into an increase in current sales causing the region of
excess supply of goods to expand. This is shown in Figure III by the
counterclockwise pivoting of (23) around point B (the point at which
the constraint (25) is just binding).
The effect on the notional GMELi of the expectation that clas-
sical unemployment will prevail next period may be determined in
a similar manner, the main difference being that firms do not now
expect to face any constraints and so remain on their notional sales
function. Households, on the other hand, expect to be constrained in
both markets. We assume that their expectation of unemployment
is the same as that already assumed in our discussion of expected
Keynesian unemployment (i.e., the income they expect to receive in
periods 1 and 2 is given by (24)). As before, therefore, this shifts the
locus from (13) to (23). In addition, households expect to be rationed
in their goods purchases, causing them to recalculate their current
demand with the result that (23) must be replaced by (27):
(27) GMELi{W,C):ei{c2;plP2X) + gi = xdPi,WuP2,w'2).
? +
The expected goods constraint C:> reduces the incentive to save and
so raises households' current demand, shifting the notional GMELi
to the left and expanding the region of current excess demand for
output. However, as with tbe expected sales constraint in (26), this
does not happen for all (u'i,P2) combinations but only for those at
which the expected constraint C2 is binding; i.e., for which
(28) C2<C2{p\,P2,y).
Given pl, (28) written with equality defines p^, the threshold level
of P2 at which the expected constraint c^  is just binding on households,
as a decreasing function of C2- As illustrated in Figure III, p'> must
lie to the right of p2; for values of P2 above p" notional demand for
consumption in period 2 is less than the constraint, and (23) coincides
with (27). However, for lower values of P2, households expect to be
constrained and so the notional GMEL i pivots to the left around point
D (the point on (23) at which p2 equals po)-
The major conclusion to be drawn from Figure III is that the
notional GMELi when classical unemployment is expected next pe-
riod lies strictly to the left of the notional GMELi when Keynesian
unemployment is expected. Before noting the implications of this,
we must recall that our main concern is not with the location of various
notional loci in the diagram but rather with the location of the cor-
responding effective loci when different expectations are held about
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Effective Equilibria with Arbitrary Expectations of Classical or Keynesian
Unemployment
future constraints. This is easily done with the help of Figure IV,
where the two dashed lines repeat the notional loci derived in Figure
III. As with the move from (13) to (18) in Figure II, taking account of
current excess supply of labor necessitates replacing Y in both (26)
and (27) by Y, the level of income received when unemployment both
prevails in period 1 and is expected to prevail in period 2:
(29) Y= mo + p-iyiip\,wi)+p2y2, y2<y2-
The notional loci (26) and (27) must therefore be replaced by their
effective counterparts (30) and (31), which incorporate the effects of
current as well as expected future unemployment:
(30) GMELi{ESL,K): Ci{plp2,t) + g,= xi{x2\p-i.Wi,w'2)
(31) gi =
Since tbese loci apply only when wi exceeds w\ (so that the current
employment constraint is binding), they are derived by pivoting the
notional loci (26) and (27) clockwise around their points of intersection
with the notional LMELi, i-e., points A' and A". For the same reasons
just given that require the notional GMELx when classical unem-
ployment is expected to lie to the left of the corresponding locus when
Keynesian unemployment is expected, so the effective locus (31) in
Figure IV must he wholly to the left of (30). The letters in the diagram
indicate the combinations of current and expected future regimes that
(depending on the state of expectations) may obtain in the three re-
gions bounded by (30), (31), and (15).
This analysis has three important implications. First, the vector
of current and expected future prices consistent with full Walrasian
equilibrium is not unique: when wi and pa are flexible, there is a
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continuum of possible Walrasian equilibria lying along the notional
LMELi defined by equation (15) (including, for example, all points
on the segment AA"), each one corresponding to a given configuration
of constraint expectations. Second, effective equilibria are not
uniquely determined by current and expected future prices: when
w I and P2 are sticky, there is a large region of (u'i,p2) space (including
the whole of the area between the two solid lines labeled (30) and (31)
in Figure IV) which is compatible with either regime C or K prevailing
today, the only difference being the state of constraint expectations.
Third, exogenous constraint expectations imply a bootstraps effect,
in the sense that, for any arbitrary price vector, regime K is more likely
than regime C to prevail today if it is expected to prevail tomorrow,
and conversely.
This concludes our examination of how expectations of different
types of unemployment affect the location of the locus separating
regions K and C. A similar analysis may be carried out for the effects
of other constraint expectations on all four effective equilibrium loci,
and broadly similar conclusions foUow.^ '^  In particular, the prevalence
17. Tw(j qualifications to this statement must be noted. In the first place, the
LMEL] under conditions of excess demand for goods turns out to he completely in-
dependent of the state of expectations about future constraints, just as we found in
the last section that witb Walrasian expectations it coincides with the notional LMELi.
The reasons for this are simple: the assumption of an inelastic labor supply ensures
that households' expectations do not affect their current labor supply; whiie the as-
sumptions that the labor market is currently in equilibrium and that firms can sell all
they currently wish to produce mean that firms' demand for labor depends only on the
current real wage and is independent of whether or not they expect to be constrained
in the future. A second qualification is that the complementarity assumed to exist
between employment and investment in the second-period production function H{-)
yields some exceptions to the rule that expectations give rise to a bootstraps effect in
the sense defined above. To illustrate this, consider the effective GMEL\ when excess
demand for labor prevails. When all agents expect to be unconstrained in the future,
this is given by equation (20) above. Now suppose instead that they expect regime R




(33) Ci < ei{p\,u<i) and
As with the case of expected classical unemployment, consumers expect to be con-
strained in the goods market next period, thus reducing their incentive to save, en-
foura^inp them to spend more in the present, and so increasing the likelihood that
excess demand for goods will prevail today. However, the fact that firms expect to be
unable to hire as much labor as they will wish in the future leads them, because of the
complementarity between labor and investment, to reduce ratber than increase their
current investment demand. Since their current output is unaffected, this tends 1<) make
it more likely that excess supply of rather than excess demand for goods will prevail
today. In this case, therefore, the expectation thai regime R will prevail next period
leads to two effects, one of which makes it more likely bul the other of which makes
it less likely that regime R will prevail in the present, and there is no presumption in
genera! as to which of these effects will dominate.
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ofa given regime today depends on the expectations held about which
regimes will prevail tomorrow, and in most cases these expectations
give rise to bootstraps phenomena in the sense already discussed.
V. RATIONAL CONSTRAINT EXPECTATIONS
The analysis in the previous section is open to the criticism that,
by placing no restrictions on agents' expectations of future constraints,
it makes inevitable a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the cur-
rent regimes that are consistent with a given wage-price vector. In this
section we explore an alternative approach that avoids this arbitra-
riness of expectations by postulating that households and firms have
full information concerning each others' intended future actions.
Thus, for example, the income constraint that households expect to
face in the next period equals the value of output that firms currently
intend to produce in that period. By analogy with the widely studied
phenomenon of rational expectations of prices, we label this hy-
pothesis one of rational constraint expectations (RCE). The concept
of rational constraint expectations clearly has a considerable infor-
mational requirement. However, it is only assumed that agents know
the aggregate constraints that they will face next period: for example,
from equation (34) below, firms know what the level of aggregate
demand will be next period, but they do not know its distribution
between different consumers. This assumption is not only plausible
but is also necessary if the hypothesis of price-taking behavior in the
face of fixed prices is to be maintained, since if firms knew the de-
mands of individual consumers they would have an incentive to enter
into bilateral bargaining with them.
We now wish to locate in {wi,p2} space the regions that are con-
sistent with different disequilibrium regimes when constraint ex-
pectations are rational. As in the previous section we illustrate this
construction for one especially interesting case only: namely, the
current GMEL, assuming that excess supply of labor prevails today
and that Keynesian unemployment is rationally expected to prevail
tomorrow. This locus is identical to (30), with households' income in
the two periods denoted by (29). The new feature is that the expected
future constraints, X2 and y2, are no longer parameters, but instead
equal the actual levels of sales and output which, if current plans are
realized, will obtain in period 2:
(34) ••• X2 = C2{p'uP2,y)+g2
(35) ; •• y2 = y




Effective Equilibria with Rational Expectations of Keynesian Unemployment
The main result we wish to establish concerning the GMEL ] with
current unemployment and rational expectations of Keynesian un-
employment is that, when this locus exists, it must lie to the right of
(18), the GMELi with current unemployment, and Walrasian ex-
pectations. To see this, consider the following algorithm for deter-
mining the location of the desired locus: for each value of x ,^ tbe ex-
pected future sales constraint, locate in iw],p2) space the following
two loci, which are derived from equations (30) and (34), by using
equations (29) and (35) to eliminate Fand y2:
(36)
(37) X2 = C2[p'ip2,fno ]
Now trace out the locus of intersection points of (36) and (37) as x^
is varied parametrically. It is clear that this locus is the RCE locus we
require, since (36) is the GMELi with current unemployment and
expected Keynesian unemployment conditional on a given sales
constraint being expected by both firms and households, while (37)
states tbat tbat sales constraint equals planned aggregate demand
next period. Thus, every point on the RCE locus must He on one of
the family of loci defined by (36). But, as argued in Section IV, if the
expected sales and income constraints, X2 and y2, are binding, then
excess supply of goods in period 1 is increased. Hence every locus
defined by (36) for different binding values of X2 must lie to the right
of (18), the corresponding locus wben no binding constraints are ex-
pected next period. Thus, the RCE locus itself must He to the right
of (18), as was to be proved.
This reasoning is illustrated in Figure V. The dashed lines labeled
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(36)* and (37)* represent the loci defined by equations (36) and (37)
where the expected sales constraint equals the value of actual sales
next period in tbe full Walrasian equilibrium: C2{p'[,p'2,mo + piyi +
P2y2) + 82- These loci intersect at A, since the full Walrasian equi-
librium may be interpreted as a "constrained" equilibrium where the
values of current and expected future constraints equal the actual
values that obtain in the full Walrasian equilibrium itself. Hence point
A lies on the GMELi with rational constraint expectations. A re-
duction in the expected sales constraint below its Walrasian level
shifts both curves upward to (36)' and (37)', whose intersection point
E therefore lies on the RCE locus.^^ Successive variations in X2 thus
trace out the required locus (labeled "RCE" in tbe diagram) that must
lie to the right of (18) if the rationally expected future sales constraint
is a binding one.
The implication of this result is of considerable interest: the set
of {wi,p2) combinations consistent with Keynesian rather than clas-
sical unemployment in the current period is greater when Keynesian
unemployment is rationally expected to prevail next period than when
Walrasian equilibrium is expected. In this sense we may say that ra-
tional constraint expectations increase the likelihood that Keynesian
unemployment will prevail in the current period. At the same time,
the requirement that expectations be rational places more restrictions
on the types of equilibria consistent with a given wage-price vector
than did the exogenous constraint expectations considered in Section
IV: for example, many points such as ^" are consistent with Keynes-
ian unemployment in the current period if expectations are allowed
to be arbitrarily pessimistic, but not in general if they are required
to be rational.
The implications of rational constraint expectations for the lo-
cation of other equilibrium loci may be considered in a similar fashion,
and the same conclusion follows: since every point on a RCE locus
must coincide with a point on the locus that represents the same
combination of current and expected tuture regimens but contingent
on exogenously given expected constraints, the conclusions in Section
IV concerning the location of equilibrium loci when constraint ex-
pectations are arbitrary continue to hold when they are rational.
Hence, subject to the qualification noted in footnote 17 at the end of
Section IV arising from the complementarity between investment and
18. It is possible that E lies to the left of (18), in which case the solution to equa-
tions (36) and (37) does not satisfy the required inequality constraints; i.e., the effective
GMELi with rational expectations of Keynesian unemployment does not exist.
A RECONSTRUCTION OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 219
FIGURE VI
Effects of an Increase in g i
employment in period 2's production function, the bootstraps phe-
nomenon persists with rational constraint expectations.^^
VI. COMPARATIVE STATICS: SHIFTS BETWEEN REGIMES
Having outlined some of the consequences of exogenous and
rational constraint expectations for the location of current disequi-
librium regions, we turn to a brief consideration of their implications
for the comparative statics responses to exogenous shocks. An analysis
of the effects of changes in exogenous variables in a model of tempo-
rary equilibrium with rationing must take account of both their effects
on the endogenous variables within each region and their effects on
tbe location of the regions themselves. This section considers the
latter, while the next examines the Keynesian employment multi-
plier.
Figures VI and VII illustrate the effects of changes in current
government expenditure and the state of technology (or, equivalently,
the level of profitability), on the location of tbe four disequilibrium
19. It should be pointed out that we have not established here that rational con-
straint expectations are consistent with multiple equilibria. Laroque |I9811 has shown
in a general fix-price model that a necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness
of Ihe fixed-price equilibria in a neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium is that
ihe determinants of tbe matrices of aggregate spillover effects have the same sign in
all states of the market-s. Although Laroque's niodel is a single-pericxl one, it is formally
equivalent to ours when constraint expectations are rational. However, the application
of his criterion to our niodel yields ambiguous results: for example in regime (K,/C) the
relevant determinant equals the denominator of (46), which we have assumed to be
positive, whereas in "mixed" regimes such as {CJ<) and {K,C) it-s sign is indeterminate.
The more interesting questions of whether price vectors not in a neighborhood of the
Walrasian vector are consistent with more than one RCE equilibrium, and whether
there are some simple characterizations of those situations in wbich multiple equilibria
arise, must await further research.
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FIGURE VII
Effects of an Exogenous Improvement in Current Profitability
regions, assuming Walrasian expectations. An increase in gi shifts the
Walrasian equilibrium from A to Bin Figure VI, implying that, if tbe
economy is initially in Walrasian equilibrium, a cut in government
spending will give rise to Keynesian unemployment, while a rise in
government spending will induce excess demand for goods (without
immediately disturbing labor market equilibrium). Similarly, Figure
VII shows the effects of supply-side shocks on the diagram. An ex-
ogenous improvement in profitability (due, for example, to techno-
logical progress) affects the loci as shown, assuming (plausibly) that
it raises the demand for labor at a given real wage. Hence point A,
which represents initial Walrasian equilibrium, moves into a state of
Keynesian unemployment, requiring a rise in the real wage if Wal-
rasian equilibrium is to be restored. Conversely, an exogenous decline
in profitability (due, for example, to an increase in the price of an
imported input) converts an initial state of Walrasian equilibrium
into one of classical unemployment, so requiring tbe classical remedy
of a real wage cut.
These effects of changes in current exogenous variables are
similar to those that hold in the Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model.
An important additional feature of our two-period model is that it
permits an examination of the effects of exogenous changes in ex-
pectations, both of future constraint levels and of future wages and
prices. The effects of changes in the former have already been con-
sidered in Section IV. As for an increase in W2, the expected future
wage rate, this has two effects: First, it has a substitution effect on
production, reducing firms' desired employment next period and so
(because of the complementarity in the period 2 production function
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//(•)) reducing current investment demand and therefore raising the
current supply of output. Second, to the extent that households
foresee the wage increase and the consequent reduction in output next
period, their lifetime income is reduced, and so their current demand
is lowered. On both counts, therefore, a rise in W2 expands the region
of excess supply of current output. Of course, this conclusion relies
heavily on the assumed absence of distribution effects: if the marginal
propensity to consume out of wages exceeds that out of nonlabor in-
come, then an increase in W2 could raise demand for output in period
1. To the extent that this' effect dominated, an increase in W2 would
have exactly the same effect on the diagram as an increase in gi in
Figure VI, implying that an expected future wage cut will shift the
economy from Walrasian equilibrium into Keynesian unemployment
in the current period.
The relationships illustrated In Figures VI and VII between
changes in exogenous variables and shifts in the equilibrium loci
continue to hold whatever assumptions are made about constraint
expectations. In addition, rational constraint expectations permit a
further role for demand- and supply-side shocks through the "an-
nouncement effects" of perfectly foreseen changes in the levels of
future government spending and profitability. Thus, an increase in
g2 relaxes the expected future sales constraint on firms, which both
raises their current investment demand and (by raising their planned
output next period) relaxes the income constraint facing households.
On both counts, the region of excess demand for current output is
enlarged, and so with rational constraint expectations a perfectly
anticipated increase in g2 has exactly the same effect on the diagram
as an increase in gi has in Figure VI. Similarly, an anticipated increase
in future profitability enlarges the region of current excess supply of
goods, and so has effects similar to those of an increase in current
profitability in Figure VII.
VII. COMPARATIVE STATICS:
T H E KEYNESIAN EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIER
Turning next to the comparative statics properties of the model
within different regions, we show in this section that, when households
and firms have rational expectations of future constraints, the em-
ployment multiplier following an increase in government spending
is larger than conventionally assumed.'-^ " To see this, consider first
20. The calculation of other comparative statics results, many of which are similar
to those found in earlier studies of the Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model, is left to
tbe interested reader.
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the multiplier when Keynesian unemployment prevails in the current
period, but agents make no allowance for future constraints (i.e., they
assume that Walrasian equilibrium will prevail next period). Current
employment and sales are therefore jointly determined by equations
(38), (39), and (40):
(38J
+
(40) Y = +
These imply a simple one-period multiplier, very similar to the usual
textbook expression:^^
(41) dc,
However, if regime K both prevails today and is rationally expected
to prevail tomorrow, then since all agents take into account the effect
of current events on future behavior, (38), (39), and (40) must be re-
placed by the following set of four equations:
(42) Ll - Si{xi,X2;wi,W2)
(43) Xi=-ci{pi,p2,Y)+gi
(44) X2 = C2{Pi,P2,f)+g2
(45) y = mo + Pi.^il(x,,X2;«'i,W2) +








2L The difference between (41) and the usual textbook expression arises solely
from the assumption in our model that the corporate sector faces a constraint on its
sales net of investment purchases rather than on its gross sales.
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There are three distinct reasons why (46) exceeds (41).^ '•^  First, as
shown in the Appendix, dei/dJi exceeds dci/dJci (at least locally);
i.e., a relaxation of tbe current sales constraint faced by firms has a
greater impact effect on their current demand for labor when they
expect to face a similar constraint in the future tban when they expect
to be unconstrained. This result, which reflects the Samuelson-Le
Chatelier principle, does not arise because expectations are rational
but solely because they are "Keynesian": hence government policy
has a greater expansionary effect when firms are pessimistic about
their future sales prospects. Second, a relaxation of the current sales
constraint also causes firms to revise their future employment and
output plans upward, but with rational constraint expectations,
households know that this raises their lifetime income, and so they
increase their consumption in both periods, thus having a further
impact effect on firms' current demand for labor. Third, each of these
impact effects (represented by dei/dJCj and de\/x2, respectively)
gives rise to a multiplier chain within each period accentuated by
accelerator-type effects between the two periods, as the relaxation
of a constraint in one period on one group of agents has an enhanced
expansionary effect by relaxing the constraints that the other group
faces in the current period and expects to face next period.-^ The net
effect of these interactions is to raise the multiplier considerably: for
example, the coefficient of dei/dxi in (46) exceeds that of deildx\
in (41).
To summarize, we have demonstrated that when Keynesian
unemployment prevails in the current period, the employment mul-
tiplier is greater with rational than with static expectations of
Keynesian unemployment, and greater still than with Walrasian ex-
pectations. These conclusions may be supplemented by two additional
observations. First, the efficacy of government policy sbown by (46)
does not follow from its being unanticipated. On the contrary, a per-
fectly anticipated increase in government spending in period 2 has
a similar expansionary effect. Second, tbe rigidity of current and ex-
pected future prices and wages is not necessary for government
spending to have real effects in this model: by changing the division
of national output between public and private consumption, a rise
22. The denominator of (46) mqy reasonably be assumed to be positiv£, since it
equals the responsiveness of inconie Fto a change in initial money balances mo. If this
were negative, then with fixed prices and wages the model would be unstable under
a i\\ianiity-l&t(mnement adjustment process.
23. The effect of expected sales constraints in giving rise to an income-investment
accelerator was pointed out in a partial-equilibrium model by Grossman |I972i and
in a simple general-equilibrium model by Akerlof and Stiglitz [1965|.
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in gi has real effects even in the flexible-price equilibrium described
by equations (13) to (16). However, the same is not true of monetary
expansion: in full Walrasian equilibrium an increase in initial money
balances merely raises all nominal magnitudes by the same propor-
tionate amount, leaving output and employment unchanged, whereas
when wage and price rigidities give rise to current and rationally an-
ticipated Keynesian unemployment, it has real effects similar to
(46):
(49) ^ = -I-
Ci dY d;t2 dY
, These findings illustrate the important point that the implica-
tions of rational expectations for the effectiveness of government
policy depend completely on whether or not they are accompanied
by sufficient price flexibility to ensure market clearing without ra-
tioning. When prices are rigid, rational constraint expectations, al
least in the present model, actually enhance tbe effectiveness of an-
ticipated government policy.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a simple two-period model of tempo-
rary equilibrium with rationing that lays considerable stress on agents'
expectations of the constraints that they may face in the future. Ar-
bitrary constraint expectations were shown to permit multiple equi-
libria, with more than one regime in the present period being consis-
tent with a given vector of current and expected future wages and
prices. Moreover, such expectations were shown to exhibit a "boot-
straps" property, so that, for example, Keynesian unemployment is
more likely than classical unemployment to prevail today if it is ex-
pected to prevail tomorrow, and vice versa.
It was also shown that Walrasian equilibrium and tbe impotence
of government policy are not guaranteed by rational constraint ex-
pectations , in the sense of perfect foresight of future constraint levels.
On the contrary, such expectations actually increase the probability
that Keynesian unemployment will prevail today relative to Walrasian
expectations, and they raise the value of the government multiplier.
These results suggest that the critique of the effectiveness of gov-
ernment policy presented by "new classical macroeconomists," such
as Sargent and Wallace [1975], rests primarily on their assumption
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t hat wages and prices move instantaneously to clear markets, and not
on their use of the rational expectations hypothesis.^^
One possible objection to our concept of rational constraint ex-
pectations is that with so much information available, agents should
be able to change prices directly to attain the Walrasian equilibrium.
We believe, however, that this type of argument greatly underesti-
mates the difficulties of coordinating individual behavior in a de-
centralized economy with highly imperfect information. In such an
envir{)nment the two assumptions of rational expectations and
wage-price flexibility are by no means equivalent. Even the as-
sumption of rational constraint expectations alone has an almost
unbelievable informational requirement; we defend it not on tbe
^Tounds of descriptive realism, but because it isolates the role of
wage-price rigidities (including rigidities in expected future wages
and prices) in giving rise to unemployment, intermarket spillovers,
and other such Keynesian phenomena.
Finally, we would argue that even though wage-price flexibility
may eventually bring the economy to Walrasian equilibrium, it is
unlikely to do so by a swift or easy route. The facts that shifts in ex-
pectations may bring about substantial changes in tbe wage-price
vector required to achieve Walrasian equilibrium, and that the market
whose price is sticky need not be the one that fails to clear, suggest
a sort of "dynamic second-best theorem": with limited flexibility of
some prices, increasing the flexibiUty of other prices may reduce rather
than increase the ability of the system to return to Walrasian equi-
librium. A fuller consideration of such dynamic problems, as well as
an evaluation of the ability of the real-balance effect—excluded from
consideration in this paper—to ensure the reattainment of equilib-
rium, are topics to which we hope to return. .
APPENDIX: T H E BEHAVIOR OF T H E FIRM
The behavior of the firm under different constraint regimes can
be derived directly by maximizing (5) subject to (6), (7), and appro-
priate additional constraints, but it is easier and more illuminating
to adopt a dual approach, along with the concept of "virtual" prices
used by Neary and Roberts [1980].
Consider first tbe case of no constraints in either period, where
the unconstrained profit function is defined as follows. (To simplify
notation, we denote the price-wage vector by {p,w,q,v) in this Ap-
24. Similar criticisms have been made by Fischer |1977| and Phelps and Taylor
[19771.
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pendix, and not by ipi,Wi,p2,W2) as in the text):
( A . 1 ) Tr{p,w,q,v)~ m a x [p\Fiei) - I^] -
By Hotelling's Lemma the partial derivatives of this function give the
firm's unconstrained net sales and employment demand functions
in each period:
(A.2) T^p = xi, 7r,,, = - e i , •K^ = X2, T^v = -e2-
Tbe properties of these functions may be deduced in standard fashion
by noting that 7r is a convex function of all prices (i.e., 7r^ ^ > 0, ^ =
p,w,q,v). These properties may be further simplified by observing that
(in the absence of additional constraints) the firm's decision problem
is separable into three distinct subproblems:
(A.3) 7r{p,w,q,v) = irHp^w) + TrHp,q,v) +
(A.4) = max [pFiei) - wei] + max [qH(e2,Ii)
l
max
Hence current employment demand is independent of period 2 prices
and wages and depends only on the current real wage w/p:
(A.5) 7r,^ ,^  = -KI^ = 0 /i = q,v.
Suppose now that the firrn faces a sales constraint in the current
period: xi < xi. Its behavior in this case may be deduced from the
constrained function ^{xup,w,q,v), and as in Neary and Roberts
[1980], the properties of the latter are most easily determined by re-
latingj^t to the unconstrained profit function evaluated at the virtual
price p:
(A.6) Tr{xi;p,w,q,v) = max [ir{p,w,q,v): xi < xi]
(A.7) = 7rip,w,q,v) + {p - p)xi,
where the virtual price, that price which would induce an uncon-
strained firm to produce xi, is defined implicitly by
(A.8) xi = •Kp{p,w,q,v).
It is easily seen that the constrained and unconstrained current em-
ployment demand functions coincide when the latter is evaluated at
the virtual price p:
(A.9) ei = -TT^. = -7r,,, - (izp ~ ^ i ) ^ = -"^w-
Hence the effect of a change in the sales constraint on current em-
ployment demand is found from (A.9) and (A.8) to be
(A 10) ^ = - 7 r - ^
dx\ '^ dxx
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(A.U) =-vr,,p7r,-;^>0.
Other properties of the firm's behavior in the face of the sales con-
straint may be deduced in a similar manner. P'or example,
(A 12^  Mi = _ ^ _ ^ M
du; ^ dw
dw
Since the second term in (A.13) is positive, this yields a Le Cbatel-
ier-type result: the imposition of a sales constraint reduces (at least
locally) the responsiveness of employment demand to a change in
wages.
Consider next the case where the firm faces a sales constraint in
both periods: X] < Xi and XJ < x-z- We may proceed in an analogous
fashion to define a doubly constrained profit function:
(A.U) ir{xuX2;p,w,q,v) = max\ir{xi;p,w,q,v): £2 ^ X2]
(A.15) = ii:{xi;p,w,q,v) + {q ~ q)x2
(A.16) = w{p,w,q,v) + (p - p)xi + {q - q)x2.
The two virtual prices, p and q, corresponding to the two constraints,
.if 1 and X2, are now jointly determined by (A.8) (with q replacing q)
and (A.17):
As before, the doubly constrained and unconstrained labor demand
functions coincide when the latter is evaluated at p and q:
(A.18) e i = —IT,,. = -71-,,, = -TTuj.
Hence,
( A l Q ) ^ = - T r - ^ - - T T - ^
d '^  d ^ d
This may be simplified by recalling from (A.5) that ity^q is zero and
by solving (A.8) and (A.17) for dpldx\. This yields
lA 90) M i = -jT [TT - TT TT-'TT 1-1
dJCi
This is clearly greater than (A.U), which proves that (as was asserted
in Section VI) the presence of an expected future sales constraint
increases the responsiveness of current employment demand to a
relaxation of the current sales constraint.
It should be clear how these techniques may be used to deduce
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